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Abstract. This article describes a psychology that seems to pertain to United States (US) policy towards
decreasing the export of illicit drugs from Colombia.
US President Clinton's visit to Colombia was intended to provide impetus for a grand new initiative,
"Plan Colombia," that among other things is to successfully confront and attenuate many of the
components of the festering illicit drug problem. However, a close look at the goals of the Plan and US
support for it suggests that nothing is grand or new.
One aspect of the Plan and US support is to effect local elections in the southern provinces as well as
judicial reform nation-wide. Both might possibly reinforce a pro forma perspective that the Colombian
government is increasingly in control of these provinces. However, elections and judicial reform--as has
been the case with past elections--seem destined to have little salient effect on de facto rebel and
trafficker operations. Most often, the positive potential of elections and reform in such situations has
been and can be too easily subverted by facts on the ground.
Another aspect is to improve the human rights record of the armed forces. This improvement has
instrumental weaknesses against an adversary with no such restraints even as it might secure the ethical
and moral high ground from the point of view of human rights organizations. Moreover, human rights
requirements and hopes are being waived in the service of the instrumental by the US executive branch.
An additional aspect is to significantly increase military and police efforts against rebels and traffickers.
However, the commitment of treasure, political will, and loss of life to emerge victorious is just not
there and, perhaps, could not be because of the fungible nature of illicit drug production and trafficking.
Yet another aspect is to provide jobs for refugees and promote alternative development projects for
coca-growing peasants. This is a reasonable idea in the abstract that runs to ground on the shoals of
concrete fact. The point is that there does not seem to be an economically sustainable or viable process
to develop and maintain attractive (from the point of view of the poor) economic alternatives to directly
and indirectly supporting the rebels and engaging in coca growing.
A psychopolitical analysis suggests that the most likely consequences of the Plan will comprise
enrichment of Plan contractors, short-term political benefits for some political supporters, political
cover for many allied with the rebels and traffickers, little if any effect on the amount and price (but,
perhaps, an effect on the source) of illicit drugs hitting the streets of the US, and prolonging and possible
exacerbation of a shooting war. Although a multi-modal approach including eradication, interdiction,
and socioeconomic and political intervention continues to have significant policy appeal, as long as there
is significant drug demand from the same rich country that purports to be the primary, illicit drug
scourge, Plan Colombia is a plan only for failure. (See Cheurprakobkit, S. (2000). The drug situation in
Thailand: The role of government and the police. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19, 17-26; Jarkik, M.E.
(1990). The drug dilemma: Manipulating the demand. Science, 250, 387-392; Krauss, C. (August 29,
2000). Clinton's Colombia trip said to herald new era in ties. The New York Times, p. A9; Morgan, P.,
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Wallack, L., Buchanan, D. (1988). Waging drug wars: Prevention strategy or politics as usual. Drugs and
Society, 3, 99-124; Najam, N. (1997). Drug addiction: Are political and legal solutions effective? Journal
of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 23, 89-94; Williams, C R., & Arrigo, B.A. Discerning the
margins of constitutional encroachment: The drug courier profile in the airport milieu. American Journal
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2
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol9/iss8/2

2

